Former Malaysian Navy chief call for strengthening defense as country seeks to secure its South China Sea claims

He said the acquisition of military and security assets needed a proper development plan, considerable time, an adequate budget, and manpower trained to handle increasingly sophisticated equipment and software.

“As it is, our previous governments have through the years neglected the defence and security forces for far too long through unnecessary politicking – much to the detriment of our capabilities in critically safeguarding our shores and airspace credibly,” he said.

He also lamented the practice of paying “inefficient and ineffective (local) contractors” upfront before they begin their task, with the government and end-user suffering when these contractors fail to deliver.

He cited the awarding of contracts for new-generation patrol vessels in the 1990s, and the subsequent delays in acquiring the littoral mission ships and littoral combat ships as examples.

“We have been making the same mistakes repeatedly, and paying a heavy price at the expense of our defence and security of the nation,” he said.

“There ought to be a proper check and balance to thwart the leakages which are very critical. They have left a deep chasm, and the government needs to urgently wake up.”

Slippery grip on South China Sea claims

Malaysia is a key component of the global maritime trade, sharing the Malacca Straits chokepoint with Indonesia and a long coastline along the South China Sea, an area which has seen ever more aggressive moves by China to claim the area under its infamous “nine-dash” line.

Malaysia has been falling behind on its defensive capabilities with a number of high profile scandals plaguing its armed forces in recent years. The extent of the problem was first revealed when under then Pakatan Harapan Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, who had come to power in the landmark 2018 national elections.

His appointed Defence Minister Mohamad Sabu told parliament soon after that only four of 28 of the country’s Sukhoi Su-30MKM and MiG-29 jets were operational due to a “lack of maintenance”.

A more recent and even bigger embarrassment is the ongoing scandal surrounding the Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) scandal in which not a single ship has been delivered while the project cost has increased from RM9 billion to RM11.2 billion, while the number of vessels ordered has been cut from six to five.

The navy operates a large number of ships commissioned in the 1970s and a number which were commissioned in the late 1960s. It also relies on its Coast Guard, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (MMEA) to enforce its claims in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which in turn is in need of newer vessels.

China has carried out repeated incursions into Malaysia’s EEZ, with the most dramatic in recent times being the formation flying of a group of strategic lift aircraft in 2021 as the country was under lockdown during the COVID-10 pandemic.

The country’s oil and gas fields and prospector vessels have not been spared either with constant reports or harassment.

Peace through deterrence and strength

Malaysia still lacks long range air defense capabilities but operates a number of effective anti-ship missiles including the French-built Exocet MM40 and Norwegian-built Naval Strike Missile (NSM). In securing its interest the country must implement an effective asymmetrical Anti-Access/Area Denial (or A2/AD) that utilises cheaper but no less effective systems such as mines, sensors and long range anti-air and anti-ship capabilities.

These are readily available and can be purchased, integrated and deployed at far shorter times than the purchase of large surface combatants. Malaysia should also expand its submarine fleet to present a credible threat against any naval intrusions and harassment of its oil and gas prospecting vessels and fishing fleet.

While building up Malaysia’s defensive capabilities to protect its interests against China on its own remains an unrealistic proposition, Malaysia is able to take the lead in forming a defensive grouping with ASEAN states that seek the same security guarantees.

Such a grouping, can build a credible deterrence through the construction of comprehensive radar and other surveillance system covering the South China Sea will at least make China consider the real possibility of its forces being detected and called out publicly and on a regular basis, putting to shame its Global Security Initiative (GSI) and posturing over “promoting peace and shared prosperity”

Complicating China’s international relations would also be effective at providing deterrence. Should Malaysia purchase Russian-built long range S-300 and use these to deter Chinese aerospace intrusions, it would then force the Chinese to change their approach to Russia which will further pressure President Xi Jinping’s regime as it would be unable to stop Russia, which is desperate for hard cash and escaping its international isolation, from selling such systems to Malaysia and other ASEAN states which would ostensibly be used to target China’s military assets.

Malaysia, along with other ASEAN states, must continue their tacit support of Western freedom of navigation exercises and upgrade their cooperating with the West through increased dialogue, participation in joint exercises and setting down a path of eventual defensive treaty arrangements. There would be no better time as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) seeks to work with Asian partners in holding back China’s aggressive territorial ambitions.

Hosting Western vessels in the region and providing them with logistic support and other necessities would also allow an effective “rip-wire” to be laid in deterring China’s manoeuvres, forcing it to consider the presence of Western forces should it act against any ASEAN state.